Introduction
Seasonality effects in stock markets refer to a diverse set of findings concerning calendar ''anomalies" (Thaler, 1987a,b) in the market. Collectively they show that returns are consistently higher on some days of the week, or at some times of the month, or in some months of the year, than others. These patterns are not limited to US equity markets, but appear in futures, Treasury bills, debts and exchange rates, and in non-US countries (Pettengill, 2003) .
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that all past financial information is already reflected in current stock market prices or returns (Fama, 1970) . Therefore, seasonality effects challenge the EMH because they imply that, in the absence of transaction costs, excess returns can be made simply by knowing what day of the week it is, whether it is January, if it is around the turn of the month, and so on. Moreover, any persistence over time of a seasonality effect is an additional threat to EMH, because in the efficient market, once a seasonal inefficiency comes to light it should immediately self-destruct as being part of the newly updated body of information available to the public which prices are supposed to full reflect (EMH/weak). Yet apparently the Monday effect was known to traders as far back as the 1920s (Pettengill, 2003) . This article describes and investigates a new and more subtle conception of seasonality which is therefore a new kind of challenge to EMH: the possibility that seasonality is in a continual state of flux, rather than fixed over time.
One frequently tested claim, day seasonality, is that returns stand predictable higher on certain days of the week than on others. Day seasonality has a number of variant formulations. The standard Monday effect suggests that Monday's returns are lower than those for Tuesday through Friday (French, 1980; Kamara, 1997) ; the weekend effect examines the difference between returns for Mondays and Fridays alone (Cross, 1973) ; and the weekday effect (also day-of-week effect, Ke et al., 2007) is simply that weekdays differ in their expected returns. Being the most general test of day seasonality, the weekday effect is preferable to testing the Monday or weekend effects because it prevents researchers from prematurely committing to an unnecessarily narrow focus and thereby missing important results. Our results support this argument.
However, going beyond the weekday effect, the main innovation in this article is to challenge the assumption of fixity in day seasonality. Previous studies, assuming that seasonality should be steady over time, have presented mixed and inconsistent findings at different sample periods even for the same indices, detailed in Section 2. But we allow that the pattern of day seasonality within a market may shift over time, yet in a manner that is distinguishable from a random process. Thus, ''mixed and inconsistent findings" would be the natural state of affairs when testing for fixed seasonality. We call this the wandering weekday effect to 0378 distinguish it from the previously researched fixed weekday effect. To test the wandering weekday effect we model it as the interaction of the weekday effect with time, and establish that it is present in all the leading stock markets. We also show that the wandering weekday is robust to different formulations, is not driven by market trends (Jaffe et al., 1989) , and has not vanished over time, contrary to Kohers et al. (2004) .
The wandering weekday is important for several reasons. Looking to future research, it establishes a whole new way that markets can be shown to be inefficient, instantly increasing the vulnerability of EMH. By the same token, it means that any general theory of weekday effects must be able to account for a much more complex set of findings, which makes life difficult for them too. Looking to past research, it helps explain why evidence concerning a (fixed) weekday effect has sometimes been equivocal: different results are to be expected if data have been sampled in different time frames.
The layout of this article is as follows. Section 2 reviews past evidence for seasonality effects. Section 3 describes the sample and models to be run. Section 4 presents the results in four subsections. Section 5 is the discussion.
Seasonality in flux
One of the implicit assumptions made in past seasonality research is that seasonality effects are relatively stable through time. The labels on many of these findings emphasize this stability: The Weekend Effect, The Monday Effect, The January Effect, The Turn of the Month Effect. Researchers have acknowledged that seasonality may manifest differently for different markets, and have found betweenmarket variations in these effects. For instance, Agrawal and Tandon (1994) found seven markets in their sample exhibited lowest returns on Mondays, as typically found in US data, whereas eight markets had lowest returns on Tuesdays. More recently, Basher and Sadorsky (2006) have also found divergences between dayof-the-week effects in stock markets in emerging economies.
Notwithstanding these studies, which all find some kind of weekday effect in markets, other researchers have found little or no weekday effects: Apolinario et al. (2006) studied fifteen European markets in the period 1997-2004, but found significant weekday effects in only two markets. In their analysis of the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, Gao and Kling (2005, p. 75) claimed that ''the year-end effect was strong in 1991 -but disappeared later". There are different ways to interpret these results. One commonly held view is that the final destination of all seasonality effects should be the null hypothesis. Seasonal effects should not survive public knowledge of their existence, and so will attenuate over time, showing that markets have become more efficient (Kohers et al., 2004) .
On the other hand, it is possible that seasonal effects continually evolve. As an example, Mehdian and Perry (2001) found that negative Monday returns pre-1987 had become significant positive Monday returns in the post-1987 period. Evolving seasonality effects may manifest as apparent attenuation at a particular point in time, or when averaged over a period that includes both traditional and reversed Monday effects. Evolving seasonality may therefore present as absence of seasonality. The more general point is that all weekday effects in all stock markets may be in a permanent state of flux so that different researchers looking at the same series may variously report the standard effect, an absence of the effect, a reversal, or a totally new configuration, all depending on the haphazard sampling of time period that they analyse. What might be driving this flux?
One possibility that we will examine in some detail is that the wandering weekday may be driven by the conditional Monday effect, also known as the ''twist" in the Monday effect (Jaffe et al., 1989) . It has been found that markets on the down-turn exhibit the traditional Monday effect more strongly than markets on the up-turn, whether up-/down-turn is defined at the week level (Jaffe et al., 1989) or much longer (Liano, 1989) .
However, it is also clear that the way business was done forty years ago is different from how it is done today, so the conditions that promoted a Monday effect in 1970 may no longer exist today. Settlement procedures change, governments change the days on which they announce key economic indicators (Steeley, 2001) , the availability of electronic trading, the changing nature of the weekend, all have the potential to alter the significance of each day of the week. Therefore, many forces may drive the weekday effect into a continually adjusting pattern of changes. In addition, endogenous forces may destabilize the weekday effect. Contrary to the assumption that irrational effects will be automatically traded away once brought to light, there is evidence that markets over-react (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Lehmann, 1990) , though the success of momentum trading ( Antoniou et al., 2007; Asem, 2009 ) suggests a contrary view. If sufficient people responded to the simple formula of ''Buy on Monday sell on Friday", over-reaction to seasonality effects might push Monday returns up beyond equilibrium, leading to a new pattern of seasonality, which would eventually be reacted to, and so on. What would make recursive over-reaction hard to constrain is the difficulty of framing a rational reaction to irrational and erratic tendencies.
Hypotheses and methods of analyses

Fixed day seasonals
Before examining the wandering weekday effect we pause to examine the day seasonals under the assumption that they do not vary with time, which is the usual stance taken in the literature. Temporarily laying aside the time dimension allows us to re-create what researchers would have found in this data and the conclusions they would have been forced to draw from it about EMH. This makes it a useful point of reference to judge the benefits of our later analyses of time-varying effects.
Also, the three different formulation of day seasonality are pitted against each other here. We show that the general weekday effect is more sensitive in detecting violations of EMH than the Monday or weekend effect. This superiority of the weekday formulation justifies its later use in more complicated time-varying analyses.
Until fairly recently, the standard way to analyze weekday effects was using OLS regression with daily returns as the dependent and weekday dummy variables as the independent measures. See, for example, Kamara (1997, p. 70) . More recently, the ARCH/ GARCH family of models (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986 ) have become standard. They allow researchers to model variance as conditional on past variance and error, rather than fixed throughout the series, as in regression. A GARCH(p,q) model has p autoregressive lags or ARCH terms, and q moving average lags (GARCH terms). Engle (2001, p. 166) states that ''GARCH(1,1) is the simplest and most robust of the family of volatility models," and is the most widely applicable, see also Apolinario et al. (2006) . Therefore, we use GARCH(1,1) to impose a standardized analysis across all markets we consider.
Obviously, day seasonality should manifest in serial correlation at lags of order 5, 10, 15, 20, etc. (Copeland and Wang, 1994) , which could form the basis for an alternative perspective to that presented here. However, in this article we use ARMA terms as a simple robustness test. If the weekday/wandering weekday is unaffected by the presence or absence of ARMA terms, then the essential properties of day seasonality cannot lie solely within the short-term-memory of our ARMA window, otherwise they would be partialled out by the AR terms. To track serial correlation we used 20 lagged (AR, or autoregressive) terms plus a single moving average (MA) term. The lagged AR terms constitute 4 full weeks of trading days. In the usual notation it was ARMA(20,1). This specification is quite inclusive. To test for fixed day seasonality we use: 
In Eq. (2), a is the coefficient on the ARCH(1) component, c is the coefficient on the GARCH(1) component, and x is the mean-reverting constant. We define the traditional Monday effect to be that returns on Monday are lower than on other days of the week. There is also the possibility of a revered Monday effect (Monday's returns are higher). Therefore we use 2-tailed testing. Using an explicit notation for B j (1 = Mon, 2 = Tue, etc.), the null hypothesis is therefore:
Because Monday is used as the base for the day dummies, B Mon = 0, and the null reduces to:
The weekend effect is that B Mon < B Fri , but again presuming the possibility of a reversed weekend effect (B Mon > B Fri ), and that Monday is used as the base, the null becomes H 0 2 : B Fri ¼ 0 ðnull for Monday effectsÞ:
The weekday effect is that the returns for different days of the week are not equal. Presuming Monday is the base, so that B Mon = 0, its null hypothesis is
We test H1, H2, and H3 using post-estimation Wald tests.
Wandering weekday
The main innovation in this paper is to model the wandering weekday effect. We analyse this as the interaction of time with weekday. As already argued, the weekday formulation is more flexible than the Monday or weekend formulations. We achieve the same degree of flexibility in modelling time, by treating time as disconnected categories, in the form of year-by-year snapshots, rather than as continuous interval data, as is usual.
1 To be specific, the wandering weekday is tested as the interaction between year dummies and day dummies. It allows us to test a very general form of the hypothesis that weekday effects change over time. The hypothesis anticipates no particular form to the interaction, either generated by theory, expectations from past findings, or data snooping. In order to compare changes in the market we need no prior knowledge to decide on good breakpoints to define a before and an after, and in doing so introduce a subtle source of bias. We therefore preserve a credible Type I error rate. Finally, the generality of the method means that two markets that wander in different ways may still be meaningfully compared as to their propensity to wander. This method differs in two important ways from those of other researchers who have reported changes in day seasonality. Our time-slice of 1 year is much smaller than multi-year periods used elsewhere (Lakonishok and Smidt 1988; Kohers et al., 2004) . A year is the smallest time period that includes an entire financial cycle, all four seasons etc. Second, we use interaction terms to formally test changes in day seasonality across time-slices, rather than merely note that a significant effect in this period is no longer significant in that period. Accumulation of effects across short time-slices will turn out to be crucial for observing the findings that we do.
To summarize, we estimated time effects by dummy variables for year (1993 through 2007) and day-of-the-week effects by dummies for Monday through Friday. We estimated changes in day-ofthe-week effects over time by the interaction of year x day dummies. H 0 4 implies that, in estimating R t , no adjustments to the Day coefficients need be made in any Year. In other words, the weekday effect does not vary with time. Rejecting H 0 4 implies that it does vary with time.
3.3. Challenges to the wandering weekday 3.3.1. Wandering to a halt, or still wandering?
EMH expects that, once known about, seasonality effects should be traded away and disappear over time. As a significant weekday effect moves towards the null hypothesis of no weekday effect, it must obviously change. This change is also a weekday Â time interaction, but one that has very different implications from a weekday effect that continues to wander, undiminished over time. To examine whether the weekday effect grinds to a halt (as suggested in Kohers et al, 2004) rather than continues to wander, we run the simple weekday model in Eq. (1) for each year and for each index. We measure the strength of the weekday effect at each year by combining the v 2 s for each of the indices into a combined v 2 for that year. If the weekday is diminishing to a halt, the v 2 s should also diminish in size over the years, which can be tested by simple correlation.
Conditional Monday
We examine whether the wandering weekday can be explained by up-turns and down-turns of the market. The prece- 1 The most obvious way would be to use the count of trading days since the start of the series. Thus t i = 1, 2, 3,. . ., ,3791 in the case of DAX. The problem with this approach is that it assumes the wandering weekday will change in a linear fashion with time. This is an unnecessarily constrained view of how the weekday effect will wander. Including a quadratic t dent for this is the conditional Monday effect (Jaffe et al., 1989) . Jaffe et al. defined market down-turns/up-turns by average returns for the previous week, and found that the traditional Monday effect was bigger when the market had experienced a downturn, while in up-turns this effect was much less pronounced, or even reversed. Like the wandering weekday, then, the Monday effect changes over time, prompting the question whether the wandering weekday can be reduced to the conditional Monday. The week-sized effect of the conditional Monday aggregates to a year-sized effect quite naturally. A year that has many poor-return weeks in it would present a clear Monday effect in each week that followed, accumulating to a clear Monday effect across such a year, and so on; and vice versa for good-return years. The weekday effect would be different for good and poor years, and appear in our analyses to be wandering.
To determine whether the wandering weekday is simply the conditional Monday by another name, we need to show that the wandering weekday disappears when it is analysed in conjunction with the conditional Monday (tested as H8). On the other hand, if the wandering weekday does not disappear, then it is not driven by market trends. But this only needs to be tested if there actually is a conditional Monday effect present (tested as H5), or its variants (H6, H7).
To formulate the conditional Monday we first define a new variable to be the mean daily returns for week T.
If a market was closed for part of week T, W T was taken to be the mean of the days for which it was open. If it was not open at all, the means from the previous week were used: W T = W TÀ1 . We use the lagged W TÀ1 as a moderator of the daily returns in week T, and introduce the following new terms into Eq. (3):
There are two aims in introducing these terms. First is to replicate the conditional Monday and extend it to the conditional weekend and conditional weekday. These are tested equivalently to the fixed effects in Section 4.1, except that H5 and H6 are directional. The conditional weekend requires that when W TÀ1 decreases, Friday returns should increase relative to Monday. Therefore, q Fri should be less than q Mon . Similarly, according to the conditional Monday, when W T-1 decreases the net of Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday should increase relative to Monday, thus enhancing the traditional Monday effect. This means that the average of their q coefficients should be less than Monday's. But, consistent with our strategy of general testing to avoid missing results, we can test H5 and H6 with 2-tailed tests to cover the possibility of reversals of the conditional effects. Null hypotheses are therefore:
ðnull for conditional MondayÞ; H 0 6 : q Mon ¼ q Fri ðnull for conditional weekendÞ;
Note W TÀ1 Â Day are not a system of dummies so that Monday is not dropped as a base.
The second aim is to determine whether the wandering weekday is still present in the face of the conditional weekday. The null for it has the same form as H 0 4. The logic of using, as a control, the previous week's returns to condition this week's returns is similar to that of Venezia and Shapiro (2007) . Their equivalent of W T was the return from just the last day of the previous week, however.
Sample and data
Our sample consists of 13 closing price indices from the major markets of USA (NYSE composite, Amex composite, Nasdaq composite), Japan (Nikkei225), UK (FTSE100), Germany (DAX30), France (CAC40) and Hong Kong (Hang Seng composite), where we would expect the markets to run most efficiently. We also include China (Shanghai A Shares, Shanghai B Shares, Shenzhen A Shares, Shenzhen B Shares) and India (Sensex30) as important upcoming emerging markets.
Multiple indices aid in generalisation of the findings, particularly when drawn from developed and developing economies, and prevent data snooping, which has been seen as an endemic problem in seasonality research (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; Sullivan et al., 2001) . Multiple indices within a country (USA and China) are justified by size, but also because specific comparisons between those markets can be made with fewer confounding factors to cloud the issue. For instance, Chan et al. (2004) have documented greater levels of institutional holdings (versus individual) in the NYSE, than in Amex and Nasdaq. If institutional investors trade more efficiently than individual investors (Kamara, 1997) , then NYSE should exhibit less strong day seasonal effects than Amex and Nasdaq. A more specific expectation derives from the findings of Venezia and Shapira (2007) . They found that ''amateurs" traded more heavily than ''professionals" on Sunday (the day following the Israeli weekend), with a particular concentration on sell decisions. Since selling drives the market down, the implication is that Amex and Nasdaq, having more amateur investors than NYSE, should exhibit greater Monday effects in particular.
Also, China's stock exchanges both have a system of A shares and B shares.
2 One possibility is that the B shares should be traded more efficiently than their A share counterparts, because of the presumed greater sophistication of foreign investors. Conversely, foreign investors may not have access to the same richness of information that A-share traders have, meaning that B-shares may be traded less efficiently. All the daily closing price index data were downloaded from Datastream for 1993-2007, inclusive. Unavailability of complete data for China prior to 1993 imposes a limit on how far back in time we go; and for compatibility of analysis we use the same time frame for all markets. The number of returns varied from 3638 (Shenzhen A) to 3791 (DAX). The descriptive statistics for returns are presented in Table 1 . Panel A has a full set of descriptive statistics for each weekday for each market. Panel B has mean returns only, but disaggregated by weekday by market by year. It is at this most specific level that the wandering weekday operates. Indices were generally symmetrically distributed (median skew across all indices = À0.02). While the indices also exhibited the usual pattern of fat tails for return distributions, they were not extremely so (median excess kurtosis = 3.82). Nonetheless, we did confirm the most critical results with outlier-robust procedures. Panel C shows mean daily returns, disaggregated by year by market. 
Results
Because the conclusions drawn from with-ARMA and no-ARMA analyses are so similar (though with-ARMA results tend to be slightly more powerful), in the text we discuss only the with-ARMA versions unless otherwise stated. Both with-ARMA and no-ARMA analyses are presented in the Tables, however. Table 2 shows that the Monday effect is significant at 5% for only Amex, and the weekend effect is significant for Amex and DAX. Given that thirteen indices have been analysed, the researcher might conclude that finding one or two significant results is not much better than chance. This is confirmed by summing the v 2 s and the dfs into a combined v 2 test for the 13 indices. We have: the Monday: v 2 (13) = 13.52, p > 0.4; the weekend: v 2 (13) = 13.64, p > 0.4. We cannot reject H 0 1 or H 0 2. By failing to find inefficiencies, these results would be taken as evidence supporting EMH across the globe.
Fixed weekday effects
A different story emerges from analysing the more general weekday effect. We find results significant at 5% for Amex, Nasdaq and DAX. Combining v 2 s across all indices we find a significant effect for combined v 2 (52) = 77.96, p = 0.011. We therefore reject H 0 3. Furthermore, no significant results were found for the Monday or weekend effects that were not also found for the weekday effect. Therefore, the omnibus weekday test detected the same effects that the Monday and weekend tests detected, but more besides.
We draw two conclusions. First, seasonality effects still exist to push returns for some days of the week lower than for others, though not necessarily Monday relative to Friday, or Monday relative to the rest of the week. These effects, more evident in some markets than others, must persist long enough to register as time-invariant day-of-the-week differences, certainly long enough to take it outside the ARMA window of 20 lags. Second, the continued existence of relatively stable seasonality effects may have been missed had we taken too narrow a perspective (e.g. testing only for the Monday effect). Analysing for the more general weekday effect, rather than the specific Monday or weekend effects, is not only good statistical practice, but turns out to have been more powerful in rejecting the null of market efficiency.
Wandering weekday effect
To test H4, the wandering weekday effect, we use Eq. (3). The null is that the weekday effect does not change its pattern significantly over the years of analysis. Obviously, in rejecting H 0 4 we would be undermining the very assumption we made in analysing the fixed weekday effect in (Section 5.1), which is the same assumption tacitly made in previous research. The results for tests of the year Â day interaction terms are in Table 3 . Most obviously, the wandering weekday is significant at the 1% level for all 13 indices. Therefore we reject H 0 4. The results present a much stronger case against EMH than those from the previous section.
Analyzing the S&P500 from 1980 onwards, Galai et al. (2008) found that outliers in the data tended to mask seasonality effects. However, it is also possible that in other data outliers might actually be responsible for (spurious?) seasonality effects that would not be found if outliers were eliminated from the data. Therefore, as a general robustness check, the assumption of Gaussian disturbance terms was relaxed, by repeating the analyses but using the general error distribution (GED). Rather than excluding extremes readings as unlikely to have come from a Gaussian distribution (i.e. treat them as outliers, as in Galai et al.) , this approach seeks to incorporate extremes as natural observations from fat-tailed distributions. All results were again significant, the overall level of significance of the GED version (geometric mean probability = 1.26 Ã 10 À11 ) being approximately equivalent to the Gaussian version (5.29 Ã 10 À10 ). Furthermore, the ranking of the indices by strength of wandering weekday was roughly as before (Spearman's rank correlation Rho = 0.83).
The interaction of year Â day (wandering weekday) is that the pattern of the weekday effect is not fixed but changes over time. Different from the random walk, which has no memory, the weekday effect must have some memory so that it dwells near one pattern long enough to be detected within our one-year time-slices. On the other hand, the wandering weekday does not have the near-perfect memory of the fixed weekday, which is presumed to be stable over time. Therefore, in terms of its memory, the wandering weekday effect lies between the random walk and the fixed week effect. It is transiently stable.
There are several more specific points of interest. First, if the size of the wandering weekday is a sign of market inefficiency, then we can see from Table 3 that the Indian and Chinese markets were generally more inefficient than those in western economies, as anticipated at the outset. Second, the evidence is positive but weak for the greater efficiency of NYSE than Amex and Nasdaq. Recall that NYSE has a greater proportion of institutional investors than the other two. The size of the fixed weekday effect is larger for Amex and Nasdaq than for NYSE, but the size of the wandering weekday effect is greater for Nasdaq than both NYSE and Amex, which are themselves about equivalent. Note also that the specific Monday effect was no more pronounced than the general weekday for Amex and Nasdaq relative to NYSE, as anticipated by our extrapolation of the findings in Venezia and Shapiro (2007) . Finally, there is no real support for the contention that Chinese B shares would be traded more efficiently than A shares, or vice versa.
Challenges to wandering weekday effect 4.3.1. Still wandering
To test whether the weekday effect wanders to a halt or continues to wander, we reran Eq. (1) for each index but for each of the 15 years separately. For these analyses no-ARMA results are presented in Table 4 3 .
For each year the combined v 2 statistic across all indices was used as a simple measure of the strength of the weekday effect present in that year. The results are clear cut. There was no decrease (or increase) in the size of the weekday effect over the period (Spearman's Rho = À0.11 for the correlation of year with size of effect). The same lack of trend was found when the indices were , so these columns can be turned into z-tests. The daily returns for each stock market in the period 1993-2007 are estimated by weekday dummies, year dummies, and the interaction of day Â year dummies as in Eq. (3). As in Table 1 , error is estimated by GARCH(1,1), and estimates are repeated both with and without ARMA(20,1). Post-estimation Wald tests are conducted to test: H4: The year Â day coefficients are jointly different from zero.
v 2 s for this test are in data columns 1 (no ARMA in estimation), and 3 (ARMA included), and associated probabilities are in columns 2 and 4, respectively.
3 When ARMA components were modeled, 47 of the 195 GARCHs failed to converge, possibly due to under-constraint in estimating with these additional 21 terms. For this reason, we used no ARMA.
analysed separately for developed and for developing economies: Rho = À0.28 and 0.18, respectively. Therefore, the wandering weekday is not a weekday effect in 1993 grinding towards a halt in 2007, as in the disappearing weekday scenario painted by Kohers et al. (2004) . Instead, the weekday effects are as strong in 2007 as they were in 1993, albeit having different forms. The wandering weekday is still wandering.
Conditional weekday vs. wandering weekday
In this subsection we consider whether the wandering weekday effect can be explained by the moderating effect of market upturns and downturns.
In comparison with Table 2 , the results in Table 5 show that Monday/weekend/weekday effects all fare much better when treated dynamically, as conditional on recent movements in the market; and in particular, the Monday and weekend each have nearly as many significant effects for as many indices as does weekday. All three versions of day seasonality are significant when v 2 s are combined over the indices. With ARMA terms included in the model, the v 2 are 462.9, 385.7, and 597.0, with df = 13, 13, 52, respectively. All p < 0.001. These results are a comprehensive endorsement of the conditional Monday, generalized to conditional weekend and conditional weekday effects, and across the world's major stock exchanges.
More importantly for the purposes of this article, the wandering weekday effect is still significant for all indices. We conclude that the wandering weekday cannot be reduced to the conditional weekday. In fact, judging by the relative size of the combined v The overall conclusion is that there are sources of variation in the weekday effect that are not captured by the conditional weekday, so the latter is not a complete theory. The wandering weekday is still unexplained.
Trading strategies
Rejecting EMH implies that it should be possible to articulate trading strategies to benefit from excess returns -the equivalent of ''buy on Monday, sell on Friday" for the traditional fixed weekend effect. It turns out that the design of our analyses is not optimized for this particular purpose. Nonetheless, the attempt to do so is worthwhile in two ways. It makes more concrete for the reader the transient forms of the weekday effect, and it also points up some minimum requirements in the design of any future attempt to capture time-varying trading rules. The wandering weekday recommends us to replace the assumption of a fixed Monday effect for all markets and for all time with information about weekday effects in a particular market, and at a particular time. As an illustration, the significant v 2 for Amex in 1997 of 16.98 (see Table 4 ) tests whether the GARCH regression coefficients are different from each other. But this information alone does not tell us which should be buying or selling days. Instead we need to consider GARCH regression coefficients themselves, the usual form for which is:
Tuesday through Friday have z-values, respectively, of 1.44, À1.82, À1.79, and À0.9, with 1.39 for the constant. No day has a return that is significantly more (or less) than the base of Monday. Eq. (5) can be re-run, or be re-arranged, to give a different day as the base for the dummies, or with no regression constant so that all weekdays are measured relative to zero, as follows: Stepping into the New Year of 1998, and armed with the most up-to-date analyses (Eq. (6)), our investor might apply the same buy-on-Tuesday strategy that would have been good for 1997. But the fact that the weekday effect wanders implies that the usefulness of the information in Eq. (6) will diminish as we move further away from 1997. We get a general idea about the lifeexpectancy of our estimates in a particular market by the correlation between the coefficients for the weekday returns for this year and the weekday returns for next year. The median of such correlations is just 0.175 across all years and all markets, meaning that typically, only 3% of the variance in next year's coefficients will be explained by this year's. Also, only 59.3% of the correlations were even positive. Therefore, estimates of daily returns made on data from year t will be only slightly informative if used throughout year t + 1, though presumably better at the beginning of t + 1 than the end. This lack of carry-over is consistent with the very few fixed weekday effects we have found in earlier analyses.
There are a number of implications for the would-be investor. First, the investor should assess whether the target market has exploitable inefficiency: our results suggest that some markets offer more opportunities than others. Second, because the rules obsolesce, the investor should update his/her estimates not just annually, as in our analyses, but as frequently as possible. Third, given that the pattern of day seasonality changes with time in every market, the estimating method should give greater weight to recent observations in forecasting future patterns. Clearly, one direction for future research is to explore these parameters with trading strategies as the primary focus of interest.
Conclusion and discussion
This article makes the case for analyzing day seasonals as timevarying rather than as fixed in time. Doing so reveals new sources of market inefficiency that the standard perspective ignores. When analyzing for fixed seasonality effects among days of the week, and combining over indices, our results show there are no Monday or weekend effects, but there is a significant general weekday effect. This provides evidence for market inefficiency and also demonstrates that analyzing for general weekday effects is superior to the specific Monday or weekend effects. What the weekday effect loses in statistical power over more precise tests, it more than makes up for in capturing more subtle between-weekday variability.
More importantly, we show the wandering weekday effect, which abandons the assumption that a weekday effect is fixed over time, detects previously uncharted inefficiencies. Under this analysis all markets are seen to be inefficient, whereas the fixed weekday identified a minority as inefficient. We find these results robustly whether ARMA components are analyzed or not, and whether Gaussian disturbances are assumed or not.
Generally speaking, those markets we expect to be comparatively more inefficient are so: China and India versus the western markets; Amex and Nasdaq versus NYSE. Analyzing the relative efficiencies of markets by these and other means may be a fruitful line of future research, particularly if these could be related to market specific factors that might explain these inefficiencies.
We then establish the credibility of the conditional weekday effect as a potential challenger to the wandering weekday. We show that the average returns of last week, whether positive versus negative, affects the form of between-weekday returns for this week. This effect is present through all markets. If a particular year consists of mostly negative return weeks, while another contains mostly positive return weeks, this alone could drive changes to the weekday effect. However, when pitted in direct competition, the size of the contribution made by the wandering weekday is barely reduced when the conditional weekday is accounted for. The wandering weekday must be capturing sources of day seasonal variability that cannot be explained by short-term rises of falls in the market. Finally, decomposing the wandering weekday effect into its constituent year-weekday effects, we show that size of the weekday effect across the markets in our sample, has not decreased over the years (towards an efficient market). It is as strong now as it was 15 years ago.
Yet these findings contradict the conclusions drawn by Kohers et al. (2004, p. 170) : ''With improvements in market efficiency over time, the day-of-the-week effect may have disappeared in more recent years." This contradiction is particularly surprising because the years they analyse (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) and several of the markets (USA, Japan, UK, France, Germany, Hong Kong) overlap our own sample. Although Kohers et al.' s sample only included developed economies, the contradiction cannot be attributed to the developing economies in our sample. We found the same lack of trend towards efficiency when both developed and developing economies were examined as separate subsets.
Two more plausible reasons for the discrepancy are first, that we take the entire sample of indices as our ultimate unit of analysis, and combine small weekday effects from each index into annual tests of market efficiency. On the other hand, Kohers et al. take the individual index as their unit of analysis, and do not assess whether the separate small signals from multiple markets add up to a more comprehensive, and therefore sensitive view of market inefficiency.
Second, from analyzing the fixed weekday effect over a 15 year period, our results suggest that its long-term memory may be poor. But analyzing in time-slices of one year (either as year Â day interactions, or as single year weekday effects to be later aggregated) ensures that its memory is checked frequently enough, and over short enough durations, to detect that it must remember. By contrast, Kohers et al. reported 6-and 11-year time-slices. What seems to be important in analyzing modern data is to cast a net with a sufficiently fine mesh.
To conclude, this article reports a wandering weekday effect for the major stock market indices. Our results show that the weekday effect wanders in a way that must lie between a random walk and a fixed (weekday) effect. This finding provides new evidence against the EMH. However, given that we have no universal principle to show us how it wanders (and there may be none), it is difficult to extract excess returns from it. In this way markets, though still demonstrably inefficient, may yet ''satisfice" by being efficient enough to discourage the search for anomalous returns.
